We characterize the steady-state equilibrium in which informed traders who exhibit heuristic (i.e. , representativeness, as opposed to Bayesian) and Bayesian behaviors achieve the same expected utility. Then, we show how the endogenous, steady-state proportion of heuristic traders is affected by the quality of public information and other exogenous features of our model. Finally, we discuss how the presence of heuristic traders potentially alters the link between improved public disclosure and: market liquidity, the variance in the change in price, and market efficiency.
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Introduction
A common assumption adopted in most models of securities trade is that traders form beliefs using Bayes rule. The assumption of Ba yesian behavior, however, has been called into question by a significant body of ex perimental evidence in the psychology literature (see Ka hneman, Slovic, and Tversky [1982] ). In addition, the anomalies litera ture in accounting (see, for exa mple, Ou a nd Penman [1989] or Bernard and Thomas [1990] ) and finance (see, for example, De Bondt and Thaler [1985] or Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter [1992] ) contains findings tha t are also consistent with the assertion tha t not all individuals are Bayesians . Nonetheless, Bayesian behavior remains the pred ominant behavioral assumption because of the compelling argument that Bayesian behavior should prevail in an evolutionary sense.
1 For example, unless they lea rn to follow Bayes rule, heuristic equity fund managers should perform poorly and be driven out of business .
2
Recent resea rch, however, ha s shown that, in a setting with imperfect compet ition among informed traders, informed heur·-istic traders who overreact to their private information are viable in an evolutionary sense because they achieve a higher ex pected utility than informed Bayesian traders.:; Heuristic traders who overreact to their private information can achieve a higher expected utility because their overreaction 1 S~:---e Friedm an [1953] for an exam ple of an argument that rational behavior dominates in a n evolutionarv sen se.
2 In rC' sponse to the behavioral evidence just discussed, those who rely on the logic of the evolutionary argun1fm t would assf~rt Umt experirne.ntal m arkets do not conhtin the appropriat.e evolution ary for ces to drive o ut those who deviate from Bayesian beh avior. In response to t he anomolies literature, they would argue tha t the experim ent al design s have not a ppropriately adj usted for risk. Fur thermore. even if the a nomoly persists in the presen ce of an acceptable adj ustment for risk, they would argue that the anomolies are due to some o ther economic friction.
;l S~:---e, for example, Kyle and Wang (1996] and Palomino (1996] . De Long, et al. (1990] consider the viability of he uristic trade in a perfectly competitive market. T hey argue th at hueristic behavior is viable be cause h euristic traders earn higher expected returns tha n Bayesian traders. As pointed out by P alomino [1996] , heuristic tra ders continue to h ave lower expected utilities in the Delong, e t al. [1990] model, even tho ugh t hey have higher expected returns.
induces them to trade more aggressively than Bayesian traders. Such aggressive behavior, in turn, a llows an informed trader who is heuristic to capture more information rents (i.e., achieve a higher expected utility) than an informed trader who is Bayesian.
We build off of this ea rlier work by considering the role played by public disclosure in a trading model with two types of informed traders, heuristic (i.e., those who overreact) and Bayesian. We undertake this ex tension of the earlier work for two reasons . First, we are interested in the effect of public disclosure on the viability of heuristic trade. Specifically, does improved disclosure work to drive heuristic trading behavior from the market ? Second, we are interest ed in whether heuristic trading alters previously established relations between disclosure levels a nd metrics commonly employed to assess disclosure's economic impact: market liquidity, the variance of price change coincident with the disclosure, and price efficiency. We acknowledge that the introduction of heuristic behaviors could be exploited to generate a ll sorts of results about the economic impact of disclosure. In this paper, however, we introduce heuristic trade in a plausible manner by appealing to an evolutionary construct. By making heuristic behavior plausible, our results concerning the economic impact of disclosure in the presence of heuristic trade should be correspondingly plausible.
The model we employ is a standard Kyle [1985] model with the additional features of public disclosure of information and two types of identically informed traders :
heuristic traders who overreact to their current information a nd Bayesian traders. We initially consider a static model in which the proportion of heuristic traders is exogenously fixed. In contrast to previous models in the literature, we then endogenize the proportion of informed traders who are heuristic by employing a simple evolutionary dynamic that is based upon relative expected utilities. We assume that the population of informed traders shifts towards the type, Bayesian or heuristic, that earns higher expected utility.'
1 In our static model, heuristic traders achieve a level of expected utility that exceeds the level of Bayesian traders, provided that there are not too many of the former. Thus, our evolutionary dynamic implies that, when the number of heuristic traders is small their proportion of the population grows , and when the number is large their proportion declines. Consequently, there exists a stable, steady-state equilibrium proportion of heuristic traders. One benefit of our evolutionary dynamic, and the associated steady-state equilibrium, is that it is amenable to comparative static analysis.
With respect to the relation between public disclosure and heuristic trade, we
show that improving the quality of public disclosure reduces the viability of heuristic trade. Specifically, we show that improving the quality of public disclosure causes the difference between the ex pected utilities of a heuristic and Bayesian trader to decline.
This static equilibrium result, combined with our evolutionary dynamic, implies tha t heuristic traders comprise a smaller proportion of informed traders in the steady-state equilibrium. As a consequence, our model suggests that heuristic trading behavior is more likely to be observed in markets where public disclosure is poor.
With respect to previously established relations between disclosure levels and observable market characteristics, we show tha t heuristic trade weakens, but does not generally undo, these rela tions. For example, prior models with only Bayesian informed trade demonstrate that improving the quality of disclosure leads to more liquid markets, more efficient prices, and a greater price variance. These results arise '1 Kyle and Wang [1996] do not under take any evolutionary analysis. Palomino [1996] considers an evolutionary dynamic based upon risk a dj usted r et urn realizations. \\lhile Palomino's choice of a dyn amic is consistent with m uch of the literature in evolutionary economics, it s~>ems inconsistent with his critique of De Long, et al. [1990] , which sug;g;ests that viability should be a function of exp ected utility as opposed to return realizations .
beca use public disclosure reduces the informa tion asy mmetry in the market by increasing the a mount of public information. Heuristic trade weakens results relating public disclosure to m arket liquidity and price efficiency, but does not overturn them.
The result relating public d isclosure t o price variance, however, is overturned. To understand why these results a re weakened or overturned, note first that market liquidity, market efficiency, and price variability are positively affected by the level of heuristic trade in some (market liquidity) or a ll (ma rket efficiency and price va riability) cases. This positive relation arises because heuristic trade makes aggregate d emand more infor ma tive. Improved public disclosure, however, reduces the level heurist ic trade. Thus, the reduction in the level of heuristic trade resulting from improved public disclosure militates against the force identified in prior models without heurist ic t rade. In our analysis of market liquidity and market efficiency, the countervailing force is never sufficient to surmount the force identified in the prior models.
In contrast, the result for price variability is overturned because the countervailing force does more tha n compensate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a static model of trade in which the proportion of infor med, heuristic traders is exogenously fixed. In section 3 we endogenize the proportion of heuristic traders by introducing a simple evolutionary dy namic, and t hen derive a steady-state proportion of heuristic traders consistent with this dynamic. We discuss factors that affect the proportion of heuristic trade observed in equilibrium in Section 4. In Section G, we discuss the relation between public disclosure and a variety of market phenomena in the presence of heuristic trade. We conclude by summarizing our results .
AB discussed earlier, the model we employ is an extension of the K yle [1985] 
ci is normally distributed with mean 0 a nd variance vi, and Cp is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance Vp· Common prior beliefs on u are that it is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance v _G Note that the public information in our model is simply the private information plus some noise. This information structure is intended to capture the idea tha t 5 \rVe treat t he number of heuristic traders, N p . as a cont inuo us variable. This permits us t D em ploy a simple continuous evolutionary dynamic that yields a steady state equilibrium p . If N p is r equired to be <m integer there m ay no t be a steady sta te equilibrium . ;; \rVithout loss of generality, we have a ssumed means of 0 tD ease n ot a tion .
informed traders, such as financial analysts who cover a particular firm, have analysis advantages derived from their expertise or access to other information sources. These analysis advantages, in turn, allow them to eliminate noise from public disclosure.
Within the context of our model, it follows that improvements in public disclosure can be interpreted as making information more accessible or more available to the market.
After the public and private information is received, all traders submit demand orders to the market maker. Liquidity demand is "noise" in our model: it is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance v 1 . Alternatively, informed trader demands are chosen strategically. After receiving the aggregate demand order, the market maker sets a price conditional upon aggregate demand and the public information. All orders are then cleared at that price . After trade takes place, the terminal value is realized and claims are paid. Kahneman, Slovic, and T versky [1982] . The assumption that r > 1 is consistent with the base rate fallacy because it implies heuristic traders place too much emphasis on their current information and too little on public information when forming posterior beliefs. It is also consistent with the notion of overconfidence because the heuristic traders are too confident in their private information?
We assume that market making is a perfectly competitive industry. Conseq uently, we require that the market maker sets price equal to the conditional ex pectation of the asset's terminal value, plus an amount to cover the costs of supplying liquidity.
Formally, let D represent the total net demand for firm shares and r > 0 some exogenous cost of supplying liquidity (e.g., inventory holding costs). The exogenous cost is a function of the demand orders tha t cannot be crossed, or total net demand,
D.
We assume that the price set to execute trades by the ma rket maker, P , equals the ex pecta tion of the asset's terminal value based on total net demand plus an amount to cover costs : In the standard Kyle [1985] model, the only driver of trading cost is the information asymmetry between the informed traders and the market maker. All other drivers of trading cost, such as the order processing and inventory holding costs identified in the empirical literature (see Stoll [1989] ) , are assumed away. In our setting, the elimination of other drivers of trading cost corresponds to c = 0. The benefit of assuming away other trading costs in the standard model is that it permits a n elegant, closed-form, linear equilibrium. This clean characterization facilitates the analysis of the implications of information asymmetry. Unfortunately, when heuristic trade is introduced into the standard model with c = 0, a linea r equilibrium m ay fail to exist.
Introducing other drivers of trading cost ensures the existence of a linear equilibrium, which, in turn, facilitates the analysis. An alternative to our approach would be to assume c = 0, a nd then assume that the parameters of the model are such that a linear equilibrium exists. With this alternative approach, all of our results continue to hold. The advantage of our approach is that it allows us to discuss comparative static results without continua lly qualifying our discussion with the assumption that an equilibrium exists over the comparative static range.
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An equilibrium for our model must satisfy the following two criteria .
i) The pricing function must satisfy eqn. (5) given the equilibrium trading strategies of the informed traders.
6 'vVe a ssume the market m aker behavL 'S in a Bayesian manner. One justification for this assump tion is that Bayesian behavior is s uperior in perfectly com petitive (i.e. , price-taking) settings. 0 Of course, there are alternative ways to introduce a trading cost that are not associated with the adverse selection problem. For exam ple, e ach trader could be charged a tran saction cost that is increasing in hi'i individ ual demand order (e.g., c times the absolute value of his demand order) . 'vVe choose an inventory holdin, !!; cost that is a function of total ne t dem an d beca use it makes the an alysis considerably m ore facile than alternatives.
ii) The trading strategy for each informed trader must maximize his expected wealth given the equilibrium trading strategies of the other informed traders and the equilibrium pricing function.
In the following analysis, we conjecture and then confirm the existence of a unique linear equilibrium in which price is increasing in total net demand: that is, an equilibrium in which informed traders' demand functions are linear functions of their private information and the market maker's pricing function is an increasing linear function of total net demand. Specifically, the conjectured trading strategy of trader n is given by:
The ma rket maker's pricing function in our conjectured equilibrium is: We begin our construction of the linear equilibrium by solving informed trader m's optimization problem given conjectured demand functions for the other informed traders of the form in eqn. (6) and a conjectured pricing function of the form in eqn. 
where (9) (10) The trader's optimization p roblem is a strictly concave p rogramming problem. Consequently, the first order condition provides a unique characterization of m 's optimal d emand function, which is linear in the p rivate and public information: specifically,
and
Eqn. (13) implies that trader m! s demand coefficient on public information is the same regardless of his type. Eqn. (14) implies that trader m's demand coefficient on private infor ma tion is greater if rn is a he w ·-istic type because a heuristic trader places more weight on his private information tha n a Bayesia n trader. These two observations imply that heuristic traders react more aggressively to their information.
In addition, like the standard Kyle model, rn's demand coefficients are decreasing in magnitude in the demand coefficients of other traders, and increasing in magnitude in market liquidity as represented by ,
Before proceeding, it is useful to exploit the demand conditions form to establish the result that all traders of the same type must have the same demand coefficient in any linear equilibrium. Note that eqns . (14) and (15) imply that, in a ny linear equilibrium, where
.F: 
.
and -Ap
In summary, we have shown that given a linear pricing function, dema nd functions for each informed trader type a re linear. W ith this result in hand, we next consider the form of the pricing function given linea r demand functions .
Assuming linear demand functions, the market maker's ex pect ation of u conditional upon the public information a nd observed total net demand sat isfies (23) Eqn. (23) implies a linea r pricing funct ion with the following coefficients:
The expression for Av has the standard implications. First, assuming that Fi > 0 in equilibrium (which turns out to be the case) , the market is more liquid when the variability of liquidity trade, Vt , increases. Second, the market is more liq uid when private information is less precise (i.e., v i is higher).
To prove that our conjectured linear equilibrium ex ists and is unique, we show in the a ppendix that there exists a unique solution {.fih, .fi 1 , .fph , .fpb, Fi , F p, Av,  .Ap} tha t satisfies the eight linear equilibriu m conditions captured by eqns. (18) to (22) , (24) , and (25). The solution has the characterist ics presented in t he following lemma. 
An interesting implication of Lemma 1 concerns the trading strategies of each type. Lemma 1 states that heuristic traders always respond more aggressively than Bayesian traders to private information: that is, they go "longer" on good private news and "shorter" on bad private news ( .fih > .fib)-This aggressive behavior can be beneficial to heuristic traders in that it permits them to capture more of the rents from their private information.
The fact that the heuristic traders take more extreme positions in the same direction as the private news implies that heuristic demand may go in the opposite direction of Bayesian demand. Specifically, for some realizations of xi , :x;P, a heuristic trader may be long (short) while a Bayesian trader is short (long). Demands may go in opposite direction because excessive demand by heuristic traders can result in the expecta tion of price "overreacting" in the sense that 
Noting that Fi > 0 in any equilibrium in which >..n + c > 0 , this implies that the market maker's sensitivity to total net demand is increasing in Fi when Fi is small and decreasing in Fi when Fi is a large: that is, Av is unimodal in Fi . Using eqns.
(20) and (21) , the aggregate demand coefficient function can be characterized by 
Once again, if a ll traders are Bayesian, p = 0, then eqn. (28) is always trivially satisfied. However, when p > 0, an equilibrium exists only in the event that the number of informed traders, N , is sufficiently small. When c > 0, eqn. (28) is no longer a necessary condition. Thus, requiring that c > 0 always ensures a linear equilibrium in which price is increasing in total demand.
Steady-State Heuristic Trade
Having characterized an equilibrium for our static model in which the proportion of heuristic trade is exogenous , we now utilize that static model within a dynamic evolutionary framework to endogenize the extent of heuristic trade. In our discussion of the trading strategies adopted by each type, we alluded to the potential for heuristic traders to gain or lose relative to Bayesian traders as a result of their aggressive behavior. VVhether heuristic traders gain or lose relative to Bayesian traders is a logical determinant of the viability of heuristic behavior in an evolutionary sense.
Let nh(P) and nb(P) represent the (Bayesian) expected profits , which are also the expected utilities because all traders are risk neutral, of a heuristic and a Bayesian trader, respectively. Note that n h(P ) a nd n 6 (p) are functions of the proportion of heuristic traders , p . To address the viability of heuristic behavior, we consider a simple continuous evolutionary dynamic that is a function of the d ifference in the expected profits of each type: nh(P) -n~> (JJ).
Formally, we let the instantaneous change in the proportion of heuristic traders when the economy is a t state p be defined as (29) where ~ is a continuous function, with only Bayesian traders has the property that 7rh(P = 0) :S 7rb (P = 0).
Expected profit is the determinate of viability in our evolutionary dynamic. One justification for expected profit is that expected utility has been suggested as an appropria te measure of evolutionary fitness in the prior literature (see, e.g. , Palomino
[1996]) , and the two are equivalent in our model with risk-neutra l agents. Another justification arises from considering a setting where each genera tion of informed traders, whose types are fixed, plays our trading game an infinite number of times . Consistent with the notion of evolution, the b ehaviors of the next genera tion adapt towards those behaviors that performed well "on average" in the prior generation. In our model, "on average" is tantamount to expected profit.
In order to establish the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state, we need to understand wha t drives the d ifference in expected profits in order to ascertain how that difference behaves in p. Exploiting the st a tic equilibrium conditions, the difference in expected profits can be written as (dh -db, db) where dj denotes the demand for a trader of type j . profits. The covariance of dh -db and db is a measure of whether , on average, the heurist ic trader is going longer (shorter) than the Bayesia n trader when the B ayesian t rader is long (shor t) .
In t he appendix, we show that covar ian ce (dh -db, db ) can equal 0 at only a single value of p and is st rictly posit ive at p = 0. In addit ion, we show tha t t he covaria nce of dh -db and db equa ls 0 for a n interior p if N is large and is strictly positive for all p if N is small. This a nalysis yields our first proposition. traders earn negative conditional expected profits (i.e. , they ma ke some "bad deals").
Heuristic traders still have positive ex pected profits because for some :ri, :rp they take bigger positions in the same direction as the Bayesian traders (i.e. , they m a ke enough on "good deals" to compensate for the losses on "bad deals" ).
In addition to our focus on steady-states, one might also be concerned with some notion of stability. A common stability condition requires that any perturba tion from a steady-state is self-correcting in the sense that the evolutionary dynamic leads to movement back to the steady-state. Our steady-state satisfies such a condition. Recall that the evolutionary dynamic requires that covarian ce (dh -db , db) 
Determinants of the Viability of Heuristic Trade
The simplicity of our model permits us to generate some comparative static results that highlight how certain exogenous factors affect the viability of heuristic trade, as measured by J}. We then use these results to discuss the empirical relevance of our findings.
Comparative Static Results
Throughout our discussion of comparative static results , we assume that N is sufficiently large to ensure an interior value for p. The steady-state equilibrium condition implies that:
The comparative statics that follow are based on this condition. We now briefly turn our analysis to the effect of variables that do not pertain to the information structure. We first present a corollary that summarizes the results and then discuss the intuition underlying the results. The relation between the degree of representativeness or overconfidence, as formalized by r , and the via bility of heuristic behavior is driven by the fact that heuristic traders t ake more aggressive trading positions as the degree of representat iveness or overconfidence rises. Greater aggression, in turn, reduces the expected profits they earn in :ri , :r p states where they make "good deals" (i.e., states where they have positive conditional expected profits) and magnifies expected losses in :ri, :rp sta t es where they make "bad deals" (i.e., states where they have negative conditional expected profits) . Thus, heuristic behavior is likely to become less viable as the degree of representa tiveness or overconfidence rises.
The relation between inventory holding cost s and the viability of heuristic trade is driven by similar reasoning. Specifically, because the inventory holding cost reduces the conditional expected profits in st ates where the heuristic traders ma ke "good d eals" a nd magnifies the losses in st ates where the heuristic traders make "bad d eals," the viability of heuristic trade is reduced by increases in inventory hold ing costs.
The viability of heuristic trade also declines in the variance of liquidity trade. To see why, note first that, in the imperfect competition setting we consider, heuristic behavior is viable because it commits heuristic informed traders to act aggressively on their private information. By acting aggressively, heuristic informed traders drive out demands by Bayesian informed traders, which, in turn, allows a heuristic trader Lo (;aplure relaLively more ren~ Lhan a Bayesian informed Lrader. An in(;rease in Lhe varia nce of liquidity trade lessens the effect of informed trade on total net demand, which , in turn, ma kes price less sensitive to t otal net demand. Because price is less sensitive to total net demand, the aggressive behavior of the heuristic traders is less effective at driving down Bayesian demands. Thus , the relative benefit of heurist ic behavior declines and the proportion of heuristic traders falls.
Finally, we turn to the effect of the number of informed traders on the viability of heuristic trade. Recall again that heuristic behavior is viable because it commits heuristic informed traders to act aggressively on their private information which, in turn, drives out dema nds by Bayesian informed traders and allows the heuristic traders to capture rela tively more rents. In a setting with perfect competition (i.e., price taking behavior), aggressive behavior is not rewarded because it does not affect the demands of other traders. Noting that traditional oligopoly settings converge to perfectly competitive settings as the number of participants becomes infinite, it is logical that the proportion of heuristic informed traders decreases in the number of informed traders . Indeed, one ca n show that the proportion of heuristic traders sustained in the steady-sta te approaches zero as the number of informed traders approaches infinity.
2 Empirical Relevance
At this stage it is useful to step back and discuss the empirical relevance of our findings . Our comparative static results provide explicit predictions regarding the extent of heuristic behavior. Direct tests of these predictions , however, are likely to be difficult beca use doing so would require a good proxy for heuristic trade. We a re reluct ant to suggest such a proxy. Nonetheless, our model has some less explicit implications that do pertain t o the anomalies literature. In particular, if some of the anomalous empirical findings are driven by representativeness or overconfidence on the part of some traders, our model provides implicit predictions regarding the settings where the anomalous behavior should be most prominent. For example, Ou and Penman [1989] find evidence that prices overreact to transitory components of earnings . If these findings are driven by the presence of traders who overreact to their information, then one might expect overreaction to be more pronounced in markets where there are more heuristic traders. Our model, by suggesting some determinants of heuristic trade, provides some predictions regarding overreaction: namely, the overreaction to tra nsitory components of earnings should be grea ter in markets or for firms where there is less public disclosure or less liquidity trade.
Our model's insights also apply to papers in the finance literature that suggest excess returns can be attained by adopting contrarian investment strategies (i.e., buying the winners and selling the losers) .
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Again, if this finding is driven by the presence of heuristic t raders who overreact, then our model provides some predictions as to settings where the returns to contrarian investing should be greatest: namely, the returns should be greatest in markets or for firms where there is less public disclosure and less liquidity trade.
Of course, there are anomalies that our particular behavioral construct cannot easily address . One that immedia tely comes to mind is the u nd erreaction of p rices to public information (see, for example, Bernard and Thomas [1989] ) . The framework for our analysis, however, does provide a useful discipline to those who would attribute this finding to some sort of heuristic behavior. Specifically, our framework suggests that there should be some rationale for why the heuristic is economically viable, and 108L >e, for example , De Bondt 1md T h aler [1985] or Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter [1992] .
there should be predictions regarding the variables that determine the viability of the heuristic. These variables, in turn, can then be related to the extent of underreaction.
Disclosure and Market Phenomena
Three primary areas of interest in models of trade are the link between the quality of public disclosure and: market liquidity, the variance in the change in price, and the efficiency of prices. In this section, we discuss how heuristic trade introduces a force that potentially alters the standard link predicted in prior work.
Market Liquidity
Traditionally, market liquidity has been measured by the extent to which a unit of demand moves price. A more liquid market is one in which demand moves price less.
Liquidity is captured in our model by >. . 1. :+c . Because r.. is exogenous, however, the endogenous component of liquidity is captured by An.
Because heuristic traders are more aggressive in their trading, one might expect that total net demand contains more information as the proportion of heuristic traders increases. A standard model with only Bayesian traders yields the insight that an increase in the information content of total net demand causes a decrease in liquidity (i.e. , an increase in Av ). T herefore, a logical conjecture is that price should become more sensitive to total net demand as the proportion of heuristic traders increases.
However, in the presence of heuristic traders , this conjecture is not generally true: in some cases liquidity is increasing in p and in others it is decreasing in p.
Recall that An = ,r An implication drawn from static trading models with only B ayesian informed traders is that increasing the quality of the public disclosure (i.e. , decreasing vp) improves market liquidity (i.e., lowers An)Y This result arises because improved public disclosure reduces information asymmetry, which makes the price at which shares are executed less sensitive to the private information impounded in total net llSc>e, for example, pro position 1 of Kim and Verrecchia [1994] .
demand. Consequently, the response of price to demand, AD, falls . However, the presence of endogenous heuristic trade makes the relation between the quality of public disclosure and market liquidity potentially a mbiguous.
To see why, recall that improving public disclosure reduces the steady-sta te proportion of heuristic traders (see Corollary 1). As we have just discussed, a reduction in the proportion of heuristic traders may decrease market liquidity (i.e. , increase An).
Consequently, it is conceivable that the reduction in market liquidity arising from a decline in heuristic trade dominates the effect arising from a reduction in information asymmetry. This counterintuitive behavior does not a rise in our model, however.
Observation 1. .Mar·ket liqu-idity incr·eases -in the quality of the public info rm,ation desp-ite the decl-in e in heu.r"' ist-ic tmde: that is, d d >.. > 0, wher·e :\ is the steady-state 1Jp

Variance of Price Change
A common varia ble examined by accounting researchers is the variance of price change around a public announcement. In our model, the expected price is zero. Consequently, the variance of price change is captured by the variance of P. Because heuristic traders trade more aggressively, an increase in heuristic trade is likely to increase the information content of total net demand. Consequently, we ex pect tha t price changes are more significant as the proportion of heuristic traders increases .
Corollary 4 confirms this intuition. 
<P
The conventional wisdom in the theoretical literature is that the variance of price change increases in the quality of disclosure.
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The intuition underlying this result is that the higher the quality, the more disclosure moves market expectations.
Consequently, as the market responds to the announcement, prices shift more dramatically. In rational models of trade where informed demand occurs concurrently with disclosure, this result continues to hold even though the existence of informed trade gives rise to a countervailing force. Specifically, as the quality of the disclosure increases, the magnitude of equilibrium informed demand decreases, which, in turn, implies less information is conveyed to the market through total net demand. The decline in information in total net demand, however, is dominated by the increase in information through public disclosure. Therefore, the variance in the price change continues to increase in the quality of the public disclosure.
If the proportion of heuristic trade is exogenously fixed in our model, the conventional wisdom also holds for our model: specifically, the variance of P decreases in Vp · However, when heuristic trade is endogenous, the variance of the price change decreases in the quality of disclosure. The explanation for a result of this type is that improved public disclosure decreases the proportion of heuristic traders in the steady-state, which dampens informed demand. This dampening of informed demand implies that the total net demand carries significantly less information. Therefore, despite the infusion of information that arises directly from public disclosure, pnce change is less dramatic. In summary, we have the following observation. l :l 12St,>e, for example, the discussion in Holtha usen a nd Verrecchia [1988] .
13Kin1 and Verrecchia [1994] have a sin1ilar result. In their m odel, the number of infor med traders en dogeno us, an d t hey show that the variance of the price change is decrea..c;ing in the q uality of the p ublic inform ation . The reason for their result is that better p ublic information reduces the incentives for informa tion acquisition , which, in tur n, results in fewer informed tr aders in equilibrium.
Fewer inform ed traders dam pen s in formed demand. T his leads to less infor mation bein g conveyed t.o the m arket. In shor t. the Kin1 and Verrecchia [1994] result is attributable t o an endogeno us num ber of informed traders while o urs is driven by an endogenous propor tion of heuristic traders.
Observation 2. 
Price Efficiency
A final area of interest to be considered is the extent to which price reflects information, both public and priva te. We exa mine efficiency within the context of our model by considering the difference between the posterior variance of u conditional upon price, P, verses all public and private information, :ci,
As Kyle and Wang [1996] have observed, heuristic traders react more aggressively, which, in turn, implies that more private information is revealed as the proportion of heuristic traders increases, ceter·i.c; par·ibus. This result holds in our model as well.
Corollary 5. P rices becom e m ore infor·mation ally efficient as the p m por·tion (~f
'lx'> iZC ,1'a e1·s zncr·eases: / ,a, zs, -· · dp -· < .
Because heuristic traders exist in the steady-state equilibrium, Corolla ry 5 implies that the price is more informationally efficient in the steady-state than in an equilibrium with only Bayesian traders.
A standard implication of static t rading models with only Bayesian informed traders is tha t increasing the quality of disclosure (i.e., decreasing vp) improves price efficiency. This result arises because improved disclosure quality is ta nta mount to providing the market with more information. In contrast to static models with only Bayesian traders , however, a dynamic model with heuristic traders renders the relation between the quality of public information and price efficiency potentially ambiguous.
This potential ambiguity arises from the fact that improved disclosure, in addition to providing more information, reduces the steady-state proportion of heuristic traders (see Corollary 1) . Because Corollary 5 implies that a decrease in heuristic trade results in less efficient prices , there is an effect on price efficiency tha t counters the effect arising from more disclosure. Nonetheless , the countervailing effect of less heuristic trade is dominated by improved public disclosure. In summary, we have the following observation.
Observation 3. Pr'ice efficiency incr'eases in the qual-ity l~{ the public inJorm,ation de-
spite t w ee;ine in re-ur'istic tra ,e: t w t is, 
Conclusion
Pnw ions rP.sP.arc.h h::~~ shown that informffi h P.nr1s t1c. traoP.rs who ovP.rrP.ac.t to c.nrrP.nt information may do better than informed Bayesian traders. Consequently, heuristic behavior may be viable in an evolutionary sense. We extend this line of research by considering how public disclosure affects the proportion of heuristic trade in the steady-state equilibrium for an evolutiona ry model. We show that improved public disclosure, by reducing the rents availa ble to informed traders, reduces steady-state heuristic trade.
We use results developed from our steady-st a te model to reassess the link between public disclosure and: ma rket liquidity, the variance of t he change in price that accompanies a public announcement, and the efficiency of market prices. In settings where all informed traders are Bayesian, improved (i.e., more precise) public disclosure is associated with greater market liquidity, increased variance of the cha nge in price that accompanies the announcement, a nd more efficient market prices. In our model, which posits an endogenous level of heuristic trade, there is the possibility that these results could be reversed. This reversion a rises from the fact that improvements in the quality of public disclosure reduce the proportion of heurist ic trade, a nd less heuristic trade may be associated with less market liquidity, less price efficiency, etc. In short, public disclosure in the presence of heuristic traders gives rise to a force that counters the impact of disclosure identified in models with only Bayesian traders. This countervailing force ensures that the variance of price change declines with improved public disclosure. Despite this countervailing force, we show that improved public d isclosure continues to be positively related to market liquidity and strong-form efficiency in our model
On a broader level, we acknowledge that introduction of heuristic behaviors could be exploited to generate a variety of economic responses to information. One contribution of this paper is that first it establishes the viability of a behavior in an evolutionary sense, and then it considers the impact of the behavior on the link between inform ation and economic outcomes . By adding the discipline imposed by a n evolutionary construct, we avoid employing heuristics in an ad hoc manner to generate particular outcomes. As a consequence, the results attained in this paper, a nd others that ut ilize a similar a pproach, are likely to have a greater degree of plausibility.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Using eqns. (18)- (22), (24), and (25) we can write the endogenous variables, fih,
Ftvp(v + vi ) + v1(v +vi + vp)
Furthermore, note that eqns. (18) , (20) and (21) imply The following two lemmas are used in the proof of Proposition 1. We will let a "A " over a variable denote the static equilibrium value for that variable which is a function of pas well as the other exogenous variables (e.g., .fti is the static equilibrium
Fi which is a function of p. ).
Lemma Al. The static equilibrium Fi , Fi , is increasing in p: 4i:l > 0. dp
Proof of Lemma Al
Using the static equilibrium condition provided by eqn. (A7) to perform standard comparative statics analysis yields:
Recalling tha t the d enominator is strictly positive, the sign of the numerator is the sign of ':f~i . The numerator can be written as
--8
ill 0 QED ere ore dp > . . . . 
Proof of Lemma A2
(A12)
Using the static equilibrium condition provided by eqn. (A7) to perform sta ndard comparative statics analysis yields:
Recalling that the denomina tor is strictly positive, the sign of the numerator is the sign of *. The numerator can be written as 8 J -Fj\ ::vp(v 
8N
Exploiting the static equilibrium condition for Fi, J = 0, yields
Therefore :~~~~ > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
Using a variety of equilibrium conditions we can show that covar iance (dh-db, d 6 ) is proportional to K, where Exploiting the steady-state equilibrium condition, K = 0, allows eqn. (A24) to be rewritten as:
( .1Jp
The following lemmas are used to prove Corollary 2.
Lemma A4. At the interior steady-state p, j5
Proof of Lemma A4.
Using the equilibrium conditions we can show that covariance(dh -db , db) is pro- Q.E.D.
Lemma A5. The static equilibrium Fi, Fi , is increasing in r: ~ > 0.
Proof of Lemma A5
Using the equilibrium condition provided by eqn. (A7) to perform standard compara tive statics analysis yields:
Recalling tha t the denominator is strictly positive, the sign of the numerator is the sign of _ #;l _ The numerator can be written as:
ere ore dr > . . . .
Proof of Corollary 2.
Using st andard comparative statics analysis on the steady-state equilibrium con-
that -'~1~ > 0 at j) so the sign of ::~ is t he same as the sign of '; 1~ for variable z. '~~ satisfies:
Exploiting the steady-state equilibrium condition, K = 0, allows eqn. (A30) to be rewritten as:
beca use ill > 0. dK satisfies: 
Exploiting the equilibrium condition K = 0 allows eqn. (A32) to be rewritten as: +v [(v + vi + vp) 
It is a straight forward exercise to show tha t Z 1 is increasing in Fi and is not a function · f N t th t 1 > -.
. -, N v 11 ,.( v+ 1 ) >.v is the weight the market maker places on total net demand, and >.P is the weight the market maker places on public information
.fih -the weight a heuristic informed trader places on private information
.fib -the weight a Bayesian informed trader places on private information
.fph = .fpb -the weight all informed traders place on public information Fi = 2..::~~-.= 1 .fin -the sum of all informed traders' weights on private information Fp = 2...::::~~1 .fpr,-the sum of all informed traders' weight s on public information
